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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is the administrative rule promulgated by the Board of Oil Gas & 
Mining ("BOGM") in conformity with the plain language and intent of the authorizing 
statute's exemption for sand, gravel, and rock aggregate, or does it attempt to inappropriately 
expand the Division of Oil Gas & Mining's ("DOGM") jurisdiction in enforcing, interpreting 
and defining the scope of the authorizing statute? 
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a 
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference 
to the district court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy 
Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co.. 1999 UT 23, % 11, 974 P.2d 1239. 
2. Was the administrative rule promulgated by BOGM supported by 
substantial evidence? 
Standard of review: De novo review of record. Since the lower court 
limited its review to the administrative record as prepared by DOGM, the appellate court is 
just as capable of reviewing the administrative record as is the lower court, and the appellate 
court gives no deference to the lower court's review of the record. The appellate court looks 
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at the petition as if it were brought to the appellate court directly. Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991). 
3. Did the lower court err in holding that the correct standard of review for 
reviewing the administrative rule promulgated by BOGM was the "tolerable limits of reason" 
standard? 
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a 
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference 
to the district court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy 
Corp. at Tj 11. 
4. Was the lower court limited to the administrative record created by 
DOGM and, in particular, should AGCU's request for discovery have been allowed? 
Standard of review: Correction of error. In determining whether a 
district court correctly applied the governing law, an appellate court will give no deference 
to the lower court's legal conclusions, but will review them for correctness. S.W. Energy 
Corp. at IT 11. 
All the foregoing issues were raised and addressed in the memoranda submitted to the 
trial court relative to the parties' respective motions for Summary Judgment. See Record at 
563-640. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
The specific statute at issue is the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. ("the Act"). The administrative rule at issue is Utah Admin. Code 
R647-1-106 (the "Rule"). Copies of both are attached as part of the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff/Appellant Associated General Contractors, Utah Chapter ("AGCU") brought 
this action to challenge the promulgation of an amendment to the Rule. 
Course of Proceedings. 
Once the Rule was promulgated by BOGM, a lawsuit challenging the Rule was 
brought in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County. Once the suit was filed and BOGM 
filed what it claimed was the administrative record on the matter, AGCU attempted to take 
discovery, which was resisted by BOGM, and ultimately a protective order prohibiting any 
discovery was issued by the lower court. Thereafter, the matter moved to final disposition 
based on the administrative record submitted by BOGM. 
Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The two sides presented motions for summary judgment. The lower court ruled in 
favor of BOGM, holding that the Rule had been promulgated pursuant to evidence and 
testimony proffered by BOGM during hearings. In its ruling, the lower court did not address 
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the specific language in the Act nor how the language in the Rule was in conformity with the 
clear language of the Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1975, the Utah Legislature enacted the Act to ensure that mining operations 
are conducted and operated "in such a way as to minimize undesirable effects on the 
surroundings." Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-2. 
2. DOGM was designated as the administrative body that would oversee the 
regulation of the Act, and BOGM was designated as the Act's rulemaking and enforcement 
body. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-6. 
3. From 1975 until 1986, DOGM did not consider the sand and gravel industry 
to be governed by the Act. See Record at 413, 609-10. 
4. In late 1986, DOGM sent letters to several sand and gravel operations 
indicating that they were subject to the reclamation requirements of the Act because, 
according to DOGM, any extraction of consolidated materials was necessarily a mining 
operation. Id. 
5. The sand and gravel industry responded in the very next session of the Utah 
Legislature by initiating an amendment to the Act which specifically excluded "sand, gravel, 
and rock aggregate" from the definitions in the Act of "deposit," "mineral deposit," and 
"mining operation." See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-4(3) and (8). 
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6. This exemption ("the Exemption") was somewhat addressed in Larson 
Limestone Co. v. State Division of Oil Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 1995). However, 
this Court chose not to rule specifically on the Exemption at that time. 
7. On or about May 5, 1998, over ten years after the Legislature passed the 
Exemption, BOGM promulgated the Rule, as an amendment to Utah Admin. Code R647-1-
106, wherein BOGM defined sand, gravel, and rock aggregate for purposes of the Act as 
follows: 
"Sand" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately consolidated 
accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size range being 
between 1/16mm to 2mm, which has been deposited by sedimentary processes. 
"Gravel" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to moderately 
consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the dominant size 
range being between 2mm and 10mm, which has been deposited by 
sedimentary processes. 
"Rock Aggregate" means those consolidated rock materials associated with a 
sand deposit, a gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit, that were created 
by alluvial sedimentary processes. The definition of rock aggregate 
specifically excludes any solid rock in the form of bedrock which is exposed 
at the surface of the earth or overlain by unconsolidated material. 
8. BOGM held hearings with regard to its proposed Rule on two different 
occasions. However, on neither of these occasions did BOGM identify to the members of 
the public in attendance exactly all of the material that BOGM was considering in relation 
to promulgating its proposed Rule. 
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9. The first time that AGCU was aware of certain material supposedly part of the 
administrative record was after the litigation was filed. The administrative record included 
materials that were submitted directly to BOGM without the same being identified in any 
instances to any of the members of the public attending the public hearings. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Exemption to the Act enacted by the Legislature in 1987 was intended to exempt 
from the Act's reclamation requirements those activities involving earth materials which in 
place have no greater value than the surrounding material. This makes good sense in light 
of the nature of the excavation procedures of the sand and gravel industry, particularly 
keeping in mind the way that this industry removes its product as opposed to typical mining 
activities of digging holes in the earth and piling up tailings. Moreover, the plain language 
of the Act, noting as it does that there is no differentiation between consolidated and 
unconsolidated materials, needs no interpretative rule or explanation when referring to the 
Exemption. On the other hand, the Rule promulgated by BOGM is diametrically opposed 
to the plain language of the Act in making a distinction between consolidated and 
unconsolidated materials as well as in trying to place a size distinction between sand, gravel 
and rock aggregate. Further, the Rule was promulgated without any regard to the testimony 
submitted to BOGM as to the proper definition of sand, gravel and rock aggregate. The Rule 
should be struck down as violation of the authority granted BOGM, as being in direct conflict 
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with the plain meaning of the Act, and in violation of the rules of statutory construction that 
the language of an act should not be interpreted such as to make any portion meaningless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE RULE PROMULGATED BY BOGM IS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH 
EITHER THE LANGUAGE OR THE INTENT OF THE ACT AND ITS 
EXEMPTION. 
A. The phrase "sand, gravel, and rock aggregate" as a term of art indicates 
given earth material's lack of unique value when in relation to its 
surrounding material. 
Although the Act uses the terms "mineral deposit" and "mineral matter/' the 
Legislature has never expressly defined the term "mineral." Nevertheless, prior to when the 
Act was initially passed in 1975, there had already been one prior major decision by this 
Court defining a mineral as "any form of earth, rock, or metal of greater value than the 
enclosing country of the superficial soil." State Land Board v. State Dept. of Fish & Game. 
408 P.2d 707, 708 n.3 (Utah 1965). In that case, this Court was asked to decide whether or 
not "sand and gravel" are minerals. This Court found that they are not because sand and 
gravel are not "more valuable than the land in which they are contained." Id at 708. This 
Court also talked about sand and gravel as "these ordinary materials of the earth's surface." 
Id. Finally, this Court noted that in exceptional circumstances "there might be some area 
where sand and gravel are so scarce and difficult to obtain that a deposit of those materials 
would have such an extraordinary value within that area that they could properly be 
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considered as coming within the definition of'mineral...'" 14. at 708-09 (emphasis added). 
In each instance, this Court emphasized that for any given material to be a mineral, it must 
be inherently more valuable with respect to the materials surrounding it. As thus used, "sand 
and gravel" serves as a term of art to refer to material that does not have any unique or 
extraordinary value as distinguished from surrounding material. 
Cases outside of Utah addressing the issue of what is a mineral have been divided in 
their conclusion. See, e.g., the discussion in State Land Board at 709 (noting some courts 
hold that if something is not a plant or animal, it must be a mineral). See also Watt v. 
Western Nuclear. Inc.. 462 U.S. 36, 103 S.Ct. 2218 (1983), wherein "gravel" is defined as 
a mineral. Notably, in neither State Land Board nor in any other case known to Appellant 
that attempts to define sand and gravel has there been an effort to differentiate "sand" from 
"gravel," such as by size or difference in composition. Even those cases that categorize sand 
and gravel as mineral have done so without making size, geological characteristics or 
location in geological formations the criteria on which such a decision was based. In short, 
no case has been found which turns on such matters as sand being smaller than gravel or sand 
and gravel not being minerals if found in alluvial formations. 
Likewise in Larson Limestone, no attempt was made to distinguish "sand" from 
"gravel," much less "sand and gravel" from "rock aggregate." Rather, all terms were 
addressed collectively as a single term of art to indicate earth material with no unique value. 
Larson Limestone concerned a sand and gravel pit that also produced high quality limestone. 
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In that case, DOGM notified Mr. Larson that because his entire operation disturbed more 
than five acres of surface area, he was required to comply with the requirements of the Act. 
Larson, in turn, argued that the Act only applied to the limited physical area of his quarry 
where high-quality limestone was actually extracted. Because this portion of the quarry did 
not exceed five acres, it remained a "small" mining operation, and thus afforded Larson 
exemption from the Act. This Court disagreed, holding that because high-grade limestone 
was extracted as part of the overall operation of the Larson pit, the entire pit was subject to 
the requirements of the Act, even if the majority of the operation involved the extraction of 
low-grade materials or waste rock, like sand, gravel, and rock aggregate. Therefore, under 
Larson Limestone, if a sand and gravel operation were to include, for example, a small gold 
mining operation, the entire extractive process would be subject to the Act. 
While Larson Limestone never defined the sand, gravel, and rock aggregate 
exemption (finding that it did not have to reach that issue), it did acknowledge that Larson 
could "sell [his] waste rock as rock aggregate." Larson Limestone. 903 P.2d at 432. Further, 
the part of Larson's operation that extracted low-quality materials was identified as a "rock 
aggregate business" and distinguished from Larson's extraction of high-quality materials, 
with the explanation that "[e]ven if part of Larson's operation is a rock aggregate operation 
and is excluded from regulation, all the [other] areas . . . are also used in mining high quality 
limestone . . . " Id. at 431. Thus, in Larson Limestone, the Court often used the phrase "rock 
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aggregate" as interchangeable with "sand and gravel," namely, terms of art to describe those 
earth materials with no special or unique value in relation to their surrounding material. 
Courts presume that when the Legislature creates a statute, it uses each word carefully 
and according to its "ordinary and accepted meaning." C.T. ex re I Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 
UT 35, If 9,977 P.2d 479. By the time the Exemption was enacted in 1987, State Land Board 
and other cases' usage of "sand and gravel" as a term of art connoting lack of unique value 
while in place and in relation to surrounding materials was the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the phrase. Adding the term "rock aggregate" only served to emphasize that 
definition. Thus, looking at the plain language and accepted usage of "sand, gravel, and rock 
aggregate," there is no reason to break up that single term of art and segregate "sand" from 
"gravel" from "rock aggregate" on the basis of particle size or geological formation. The 
Rule, however, undertakes that exact exercise in attempting to interpret the Exemption, and 
thus contorts the plain meaning and accepted usage of the Act's language. As a result, the 
Rule is seriously flawed and cannot be upheld. 
B. The Act does not differentiate between consolidated and unconsolidated 
earth material, yet the Rule does so in contravention of the Act, 
Prior to enactment of the Exemption, the Legislature had made clear that the Act 
would not be applied on the basis of certain materials' consolidation or lack thereof. This 
intent is made clear by language in the Act which expressly declares that operations subject 
to the Act include both consolidated and unconsolidated material. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-
10 
8-4(3). Further, the Act is concerned with reclamation. The Act does not address, and there 
is no justifiable reason to distinguish, reclamation on the basis of consolidated versus 
unconsolidated materials. In short, to accept the Rule as a valid extension of the Act would 
be to render the 1987 Exemption meaningless, or in other words to allow administrative 
action to overturn a legislative mandate. 
1. The Act groups consolidated and unconsolidated materials together. 
The plain language of the Act shows that the Legislature did not intend to distinguish 
between consolidated and unconsolidated material when it created the Exemption. From its 
inception, the Act defined "mineral deposit" as "an accumulation of mineral matter in the 
form of consolidated rock, unconsolidated material . . ." Utah Code Ann. §40-8-4(3)(a) 
(emphasis added). Significantly, this definition remained the same after the Exemption was 
enacted in 1987. This language means that whether an operation is covered by the Act does 
not depend on whether the material at issue is consolidated or unconsolidated. The Act 
makes no distinction between minerals that are formed by alluvial processes and minerals 
that are just plain bedrock. The definition of mineral does not turn on this type of nicety. 
It follows, then, that any operation that extracts only material expressly exempted from the 
Act is not subject to the requirements of the Act, regardless of whether the exempted 
materials are consolidated or unconsolidated. 
For the Rule to be valid, it must follow legislative intent, determined by the plain 
language of the Act. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah. 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
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1993); see also Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). 
The Rule as promulgated by BOGM fails this test for the very reason that at its heart it 
defines sand, gravel, and rock aggregate on the very distinctions that the Act refused to 
utilize; the Rule defines sand, gravel and rock aggregate on the bases of both size and 
geological formation, exempting only unconsolidated or alluvial material. Because the Rule 
flies in the face of the intent and language of the Act, it cannot be sustained and must be 
struck down. 
2. Reclamation of sand and gravel operations does not depend on 
consolidated versus unconsolidated nature of material being 
extracted. 
The purpose of the Act is to ensure that Utah "mining operations" have proper 
reclamation plans and carry them out. See Utah Code Ann. §40-8-2. Reclamation has been 
found to be vital and in the public interest. For example, a coal mining operation might have 
numerous tunnels under the ground to remove veins of coal. See Record at 21, 22, 270, and 
271. Such a process often leaves large amounts of overburden and tailings as well as 
potentially dangerous openings under the surface. Other types of mines leave large, 
unsightly exposed holes that must be covered and re-landscaped. And other mining 
operations sort through the extracted material, taking what they want and leaving the rest 
behind in ugly and often unsafe piles. 
In enacting the Exemption for sand, gravel, and rock aggregate, the Legislature was 
justified in its approach. Rock aggregate operations are remarkably different from the 
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mining operations expressly covered by the Act, and thus entail different reclamation needs 
and requirements. Rock aggregate operations, particularly currently active and modern 
operations, start extraction at one point on a given piece of property and then move across 
the property extracting material but generally leaving behind a level area suited for 
residential neighborhoods, golf courses, and commercial use. See, e.g.. Gibbons & Reed Co. 
v. North Salt Lake City. 431 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967) ("there was evidence that the 
plaintiffs have conducted their operations in such a way as to create a future beneficial use 
since the materials will be removed so as to bring the grade down to a certain level on the 
south side to about the level of U.S. 91 where the property will then be leveled off and thus 
be used for other permissible uses"). Sand and gravel operations by their very nature extract 
and use all the material, leaving nothing behind in sorted piles. The pit floor is almost 
always level with adjacent highways or roads, and there are no tailings, slag heaps, big holes, 
or subterranean tunnels to remediate, make safe or to cover up. Typically, the ground need 
only be graded a bit and the sides of the pit slightly contoured in order to make it usable for 
commercial or residential buildings. Record at 80-81. This is why sand and gravel 
operations were traditionally left alone from typical mining reclamation requirements even 
before 1987 and are now specifically exempted from the requirements of the Act.1 
1
 That is not to say the sand and gravel operations are without reclamation 
requirements. To the contrary, they are governed by city and county reclamation 
requirements for which bonds are posted. See Record at 86, 91. 
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Most importantly, once a pit has been exhausted for purposes of sand and gravel 
operations, the reclamation necessary thereafter to make the area usable for other purposes 
is not generally affected by whether during the course of extraction the material removed was 
blasted loose (consolidated) or could be dug out with earth-moving equipment 
(unconsolidated). Whether consolidated bedrock, "exposed at the surface of the earth or 
overlain by unconsolidated material,"2 is removed or unconsolidated alluvial materials are 
removed, the resulting area left behind looks much the same. If anything, once an operator 
of a pit consisting of consolidated materials has exhausted that pit's resources, the remaining 
pit would generally be more stable than an alluvial pit where the floors and walls left behind 
could be unstable. 
It is instructive that the Act never talks about bedrock or how it is blasted because the 
Legislature created the Act to deal with the reclamation of mines, not with how the materials 
are extracted. There are other agencies, like MSHA and the Utah Division of Air Quality, 
that govern the extraction processes. Record at 87-92. Reclamation needs and requirements 
for a given mine are determined by how the area is left after the extraction process is 
completed, not by how hard or soft or loose or solid is the material extracted. Sand and 
gravel operations, with or without bedrock, clearly do not implicate the problems with which 
the Legislature was concerned when enacting the Act and the Exemption. For the purposes 
of reclamation, the Legislature never intended to distinguish between consolidated and 
2
 Quoting the Rule. 
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unconsolidated materials. However, because just such a distinction is the focus of the Rule, 
it undermines if not vitiates the Act as it relates to the Exemption, and accordingly the Rule 
must be struck down. 
3. The Rule is unworkable from a practical standpoint. 
Another reason that the Exemption's plain language does not identify or otherwise 
hinge on a consolidated/unconsolidated distinction is because of the confusion it would cause 
in the field of regulation, as illustrated by the following hypothetical. In a given pit, the top 
layer of unconsolidated alluvial material covers an uneven layer of consolidated bedrock.3 
In order for the pit operator to remove the alluvial material he is left with two options under 
the Rule. He could stop as soon as he encounters bedrock. However, to do so would require 
him to close the pit without removing all of the alluvial material. However, if he chooses to 
remove any of the bedrock, he subjects the entire pit to the requirements of the Act according 
to the Rule, and as per Larson Limestone. Further, once he stops the pit operation, local 
county or city reclamation rules generally require him to smooth out the pit floor and contour 
its walls. However, sand and gravel material typically is not found naturally in smooth, flat 
layers or contours. Thus, in order to comply with local law, the pit operator must remove any 
bedrock jutting up from the otherwise smooth pit floor or part of the pit walls. So, despite 
3
 The diagram created by DOGM and found in the Record at 232 shows this 
hypothetical. 
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the operator's best efforts to avoid regulation by DOGM while at the same time comply with 
local reclamation rules, he still finds himself subject to DOGM-the proverbial Catch 22. 
C. The Legislature did not intend to pass a meaningless piece of legislation 
in the form of a meaningless Exemption to the Act. 
Defining the Exemption in terms of unconsolidated or alluvial materials renders the 
Exemption virtually meaningless. The Rule attempts to impose a condition or definition that 
DOGM thought existed prior to the passage of the Exemption, namely, that DOGM had 
authority over all sand and gravel operations where bedrock is found and blasted. The Rule 
would thus formalize for DOGM the scope of administrative enforcement and rulemaking 
authority which it assumed it had before the Exemption was passed in 1987. Thus the Rule 
would perform an end-run around the otherwise clear language and intent of the Act by 
formally conveying more authority to DOGM than the Act and its Exemption specifically 
grant to DOGM. Thus, the Rule renders the Exemption meaningless. Yet Utah law is clear 
that "[statutes should be read so as to avoid making any of their provisions 'surplusage and 
meaningless.'" Ferro v. Utah Dept. Of Commerce Div. of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 828 P.2d 507, 514 (Utah App. 1992). Because the Rule's emphasis on 
consolidation and size of material eliminates any purpose for the Exemption, the Rule's 
interpretation of the Exemption is at direct variance with the Legislature's intent in enacting 
the Exemption in the first place. 
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D. "Rock aggregate" is a commercial term indicating end use of processed 
product, not a recognized geological term that would indicate pre-existing 
natural state. 
BOGM has claimed that the Rule defines "sand, gravel, and rock aggregate" in 
geologic terms, based on the size and location of material in the earth. Record at 151, 1624 
(BOGM's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the Larson Limestone matter 
("Order").) See also Record at 36 ("[t]he proposed definitions for sand and gravel are taken 
from the informally proposed Division version and the rock aggregate definition is extracted 
from the board order in the Larson Limestone matter"). In the BOGM Order, BOGM cites 
to authoritative geologic definitions from the AGI Glossary of Geology and the USBM 
Dictionary of Mining, Mineral and Related Terms for the terms "sand" and "gravel." See 
Record at 166. However, BOGM does not cite to any such authority in support of its 
definition for "rock aggregate." Rather, BOGM relies solely upon the "big rocks made into 
little rocks" statement made by Representative Christensen for support of its definition for 
"rock aggregate." See Record at 162. Thus, BOGM contorts logic to make the dubious 
conclusion that "it is clear that the Legislature intended the term [rock aggregate] to be 
defined in a geologic sense" without any real authoritative support for such a conclusion. 
4
 Volume 1 of the administrative record (filed with this Court as Record at 27-
252) appears to have a number of pages out of place. Thus, for example, those pages 
stamped by BOGM as 000069 through 000094 have been marked for the Record as pages 
32 to 57. However, the page stamped 000068 is marked for the Record as page 126 and the 
page stamped 000095 is marked for the Record as page 127. For consistency, all references 
to the administrative record in this Brief will be by reference to the pages as marked by the 
lower court for this appeal. 
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BOGM's failure to cite to an authoritative source, such as a dictionary of geology or mining, 
for its definition of "rock aggregate" stems from the fact that "rock aggregate" is simply not 
a geological term. 
As further support for its geologic definitions for "sand" and "gravel," DOGM created 
and presented BOGM with its Diagrammatic Cross-section of earth material illustrating the 
locations of sand and gravel within surrounding earth material. See Record at 232. While 
the diagram clearly shows the locations of sand and gravel, there is no reference whatsoever 
to "rock aggregate." Once again, DOGM's failure to identify "rock aggregate" in its diagram 
is due to the fact that "rock aggregate" does not occur in nature. It is processed end-use 
material. 
Bryce Tripp is a geologist with the Utah Geologic Survey ("UGS"), which is a 
division of the Utah Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"). See Record at 237. In a 
memorandum dated November 19, 1997, Mr. Tripp wrote, with respect to the proposed 
definition of "rock aggregate," the following: "It is unfortunate that the legislature chose this 
term since aggregate is a use term rather than being descriptive of material in the ground." 
Record at 259 (emphasis added). 
Tony Gallegos is a reclamation engineer with DOGM, also a division of the DNR. 
See Record at 237. In his comments dated December 19, 1997, Mr. Gallegos wrote the 
following regarding the definition of "rock aggregate": "If we are going to modify the statute 
let's remove the term "rock aggregate " (which is a definition based on end use) and replace 
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it with something more useful or just leave it out." Record at 216 (emphasis added). 
Buck Rose on behalf of the Utah County Community Development Department, in 
his November 17, 1997 letter to Lowell Braxton, DOGM's Director, agreed with the 
conclusion reached by Messrs. Tripp and Gallegos of UGS and DOGM, respectively, and 
even provided more legal support for their respective conclusions: "Black's Law Dictionary 
defines aggregate as material consisting largely of rock, gravel and sand used for 
construction and surfacing of highways or as a component part, informing concrete for 
construction (Pioneer Gravel v. Diamond Iron. 72 F.2d 161)." Record at 246 (emphasis 
added). 
The case of Pioneer Gravel v. Diamond Iron. 72 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1934), cited to by 
Buck Rose on behalf of Utah County in his aforementioned letter, provides in pertinent part 
as follows: "This patent covers a portable machine for making and handling aggregates used 
in highway construction. 'Aggregates' is the name for materials consisting largely of rock, 
gravel, and sand used for the construction and surfacing of highways or, as a component part, 
in forming concrete for such construction." Id. See also Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Const. 
Co.. 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969) (". . . in crushing aggregate (rock and gravel) for use in 
highway construction"); Standard Industries. Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 475 F.2d 220 (C.A.10 
(Okla.) 1973) ("'asphaltic concrete,' which is made by mixing aggregates, such as sand, 
crushed rock, and the like, with liquid asphalt"). The following cases also use the term 
"aggregate" or "rock aggregate" to mean sand and gravel processing operations rather than 
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naturally occurring earth material: U.S. v. 179.26 Acres of Land in Douglas County, Kansas, 
644 F.2d 367, (C.A.10 (Kan.) 1981); Sampson Const. Co. v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator Co.. 
Marshall. OkL 382 F.2d 645 (C.A.10 (Okla.) 1967); U.S. for Use and Benefit of Pool Const. 
Co. v. Smith Road Const. Co.. 227 F.Supp. 315 (N.D.Okla. 1964); Youngren v. John W. 
Lloyd Const. Co.. 450 P.2d 985 (Utah 1969); Ferro v. Utah Dept. Of Commerce Div. of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 507 (Utah App. 1992). 
Clearly, "rock aggregate" is not a geologic term. Rather, unlike "sand" and "gravel," 
it is a commercial term used in the rock aggregate business which describes the end use of 
certain processed earth material, not the material as it is situated naturally in the ground. See. 
e.g.. Larson Limestone at 431 (Larson Limestone's business is referred to as both a "rock 
aggregate business" and a "rock aggregate operation"); Utah Mining Association letter dated 
July 8, 1988 (referring to "rock aggregate operations" and "rock aggregate producers") 
(Record at 34); letter dated February 7, 1997 from Lowell Braxton, DOGM Director, to 
BOGM (hand-written language has been inserted in connection with "Rock Aggregate," 
which reads: "which is part of S&G [(sand & gravel)] operation") (Record at 333). 
As discussed above, BOGM relies solely on Representative Christensen's statement 
as a basis for its contention that "rock aggregate" is somehow a recognized geologic term. 
However, Representative Christensen's statement does not support BOGM's position. 
According to BOGM, Representative Christensen stated: "Sometimes when you deal with 
sand and gravel, House Members, you get some big rocks in there and you kinda [sic] make 
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small ones out of them. This is the aggregate part of it." BOGM Order, Record at 151, 162. 
Representative Christensen's concept of making small rocks from big rocks is descriptive of 
the very process described in Pioneer Gravel, supra, which is the process of crushing and 
processing pre-existing rock material to make end-product rock aggregate. This is the very 
process carried out by aggregate businesses. 
In creating the Rule, BOGM has undergone a two-step process in attempting to 
formulate a definition of the exception for "sand, gravel and rock aggregate." First, it broke 
the single collective term into three separate terms: "sand," "gravel," and "rock aggregate." 
Then it tried to create a geological definition for "rock aggregate" solely from the isolated 
comment of Representative Christensen and absent any clearly accepted geological definition 
for or consensus on such a term. Both steps are improper and contrary to the clear language 
of the Act as well as the evidence before BOGM. Such a contrived definition is improper 
and should be rejected. 
E. The Rule should be overturned because it was promulgated outside the 
clear scope of BOGM's delegated authority. 
The limits on a governmental agency's authority with respect to a given statute are 
defined by the Legislature. Agencies can never promulgate rules that are "contrary to the 
statute [or] beyond its scope." Draughton v. Department of Financial Institutions, State of 
Utah. 1999 UT App 042, ^  5, 975 P.2d 935. If there is any reasonable doubt as to whether 
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an agency has power, the issue should be resolved against the agency. See Williams v. 
Public Service Com'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 42, 50 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, BOGM received a specific grant of authority from the Legislature. It can 
make rules reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. 
§40-8-6(1). The purpose of the Act is to ensure that all Utah mines (excluding sand, gravel, 
and rock aggregate operations from that category) are reclaimed under the supervision and 
guidelines of DOGM. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-2. Because the purpose of and intent 
behind the Act does not encompass sand, gravel, and rock aggregate operations, BOGM 
cannot disregard and go beyond clear legislative purpose and intent by promulgating rules 
affecting those very operations. Yet the Rule regulates nearly every such operation despite 
the Legislature's clear intent to exclude just such operations. Likewise, the Rule oversteps 
the purpose of the Act and the intent of the Legislature by categorizing sand, gravel, and rock 
aggregate as particles of particular sizes but not solid or consolidated material. As shown 
above, this interpretation leads to contradictory and sometimes absurd results (not the least 
of which would ex nihilo bestow DOGM with more authority than it had before the 
Exemption was passed). Because the Rule goes beyond what is necessary to carry out the 
purposes of the Act as well as contradicts and undermines clear legislative intent, BOGM 
overstepped its authority in promulgating the Rule, and this Court accordingly has a duty to 
invalidate the Rule. See Draughton. 975 P.2d at 937. 
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II. THE RULE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Aside from the fundamental problems with the Rule's substance noted earlier above, 
the process by which BOGM promulgated the Rule is also flawed, because the Rule is not 
supported by substantial evidence or authoritative testimony. Indeed, the administrative 
record is quite persuasive in establishing that BOGM completely ignored the authoritative 
testimony presented to it and, in complete contradiction of said testimony, chose to follow 
a course which has no support in law or in the geological industry terminology presented 
during the rulemaking. 
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone at 430 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). In determining whether BOGM's Rule is supported by substantial evidence, 
the Court should review the whole administrative record5 and consider both evidence that 
supports BOGM's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from them.6 See Department of 
Air Force v. Swider. 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991) (u[i]n applying the substantial 
5
 The Court should give no deference whatsoever to the lower court's initial 
appellate review. The lower court conducted no independent inquiry into BOGM's actions. 
Rather, the lower court based its decision on a review of the administrative record. This 
Court is just as capable of reviewing the administrative record as is the lower court. See 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1991) ("[w]e give no 
deference to the district court's initial appellate review since it was a review of the record, 
which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the district court") (citations omitted). 
6
 In addition to reviewing the administrative record, the Court should review the 
letter dated February 2, 1987 from DOGM to Staker Paving. Record at 609-610. 
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evidence test, we review the 'whole record' before the court, and consider both evidence that 
supports the Board's findings and evidence that fairly detracts from them"). 
A review of the administrative record clearly shows that BOGM, in enacting the Rule, 
and particularly in attempting to redefine the term "rock aggregate" in geological terms, 
completely ignored the testimony presented to it, including testimony from its own experts. 
BOGM has attempted to define "rock aggregate" in geological terms contrary to and in spite 
of such testimony. 
As noted earlier in this Brief, without exception, every person who gave authoritative 
testimony before BOGM regarding the Rule's definition of "sand, gravel, and rock 
aggregate" uniformly declared that "rock aggregate" has no geological meaning, but is a term 
used in the sand and gravel industry to denote certain types of end-use product. 
Unable to otherwise identify a valid or accepted geological definition of "rock 
aggregate" that suited its purposes, BOGM undertook an interesting bootstrap operation in 
order to create its own geologic definition. BOGM reached back to the material it presented 
to this Court in the Larson Limestone case. See Record at 36 ("the rock aggregate definition 
is extracted from the board order in the Larson Limestone matter"). However, the analysis 
made in the DOGM Order for Larson Limestone came not by reason of any hearings before 
BOGM, but rather was part of the justification for the result reached by BOGM and its legal 
counsel to defend its Order. Inasmuch as this Court in Larson Limestone accepted neither 
BOGM's arguments as to the definition of "rock aggregate" nor that portion of its Order 
24 
which rested on the same assumptions (although admittedly it did not directly rule on them 
either), BOGM had no valid basis to create the Rule resting as it did solely on its earlier 
decision. 
More importantly, however, is the fact that the Rule lacks substantive support. 
Ultimately, the only support BOGM can cite for the Rule is the brief isolated comment made 
by Representative Christensen, as discussed earlier. However, as explained earlier, 
Representative Christensen's comment gives BOGM no substantive support (particularly 
when reviewed in its proper context) because it actually supports AGCU's position that "rock 
aggregate" is a term used in the sand and gravel industry to describe end use. 
In short, BOGM, unable to find any definition supportable in law or in fact to equate 
to the definition it chose to give "rock aggregate" in its Rule, simply reverted back to its own 
arguments in the Larson Limestone case, using these arguments as a basis for its definition 
which purports to define "rock aggregate" in geological terms without any support for the 
same whatsoever in the administrative record, in law or in fact. BOGM's blatant disregard 
for clear statutory language or legislative intent in its rulemaking process nullifies any 
deference to administrative expertise that this Court would normally accord to an 
administrative body. The Rule that was ultimately promulgated is designed to eviscerate the 
Exemption, was crafted as such, and should not be countenanced nor approved by this Court. 
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III. THE LOWER COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The applicable standard of review that the lower court should have applied when 
reviewing the rule and the administrative record was a correction of error standard in 
reviewing the Rule. The lower court rejected the correction-of-error standard in favor of a 
"tolerable limits of reason standard," relying on the case of Williams v. Public Service 
Com'n of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) as its authority for adopting such a standard. The 
lower court then went on to find "the Board's findings supporting the rule are rationally 
based." Record at 647-49. 
However, Williams was neither binding nor persuasive authority at the time of the 
lower court's ruling because Williams was decided and issued before the State adopted the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), and its sister statute, the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"). The adoption of UAPA and UARA has 
changed the law in Williams and calls for application of the correction of error standard in 
the instant case. 
Williams was a rulemaking case. However, the Williams court, in enunciating the 
three-pronged standard of review, did so in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16, 
which governed the court's review of the subject administrative rule at that point in time. 
Williams at 50. As of January 1, 1988, however, Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 was repealed. 
In its place, the Legislature adopted the UAPA. Thus, had Williams been decided after the 
adoption of the UAPA, the Williams court, in choosing the relevant standard of review, 
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would have relied, at least in part, on case law arising under the UAPA. Further, the relevant 
portions of the UAPA and the UARA are substantially similar and, in such situations, courts 
frequently look to one statute for guidance as to the other. See, e.g., Graco Fishing and 
Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. Inc.. 766 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Utah 1988) ("[t]his 
Court has established the general rule that because of the common purpose of these lien and 
contractors bond statutes, and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what 
is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper application of the latter") 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
In SEMECO Industries. Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Com'n. 849 P.2d 
1167, 1170 (Utah 1993), this Court stated: "Before UAPA, this court had developed clear 
standards of review to apply to agency actions." Utah Dept. of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Com'n. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), cited to in Williams, "contains the most 
comprehensive guide to pre-UAPA standards." SEMECO at 1170. 
Administrative Services established three levels of pre-UAPA review of 
agency action: (1) a no-deference, "correction of error" standard regarding 
interpretations of general questions of law; (2) an intermediate-deference, 
"reasonableness and rationality" standard regarding mixed questions of law 
and fact, questions of special law, questions of the application of law to fact, 
and questions of "ultimate fact"; and (3) a great-deference, "evidence of any 
substance whatever" standard regarding findings of basic fact. 
SEMECO at 1171 (citing Administrative Services at 608-612). "Section 63-46b-16(4) of 
UAPA7 upset these previously settled standards without indicating what standards should 
7
 This section of UAPA is the equivalent of Section 63-46a-12.1(4) of UARA. 
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replace them." Id. The SEMECO court then went on to state which standards of review 
should be applied to each of the UAPA subsections. 
Subsection 4(b) of the UAPA addresses challenges based on allegations that "the 
agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute."8 This Court, after 
reviewing relevant case law, noted that "challenges under subsection (4)(b) also presented 
questions of general law appropriate for correction of error review." id. See also Bennion 
v. ANR Production Co., 819 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1991) (applying correction of error 
standard to challenge made under subsection 4(b)). Clearly, where an administrative rule is 
challenged as extending an agency's jurisdiction beyond that conferred by its governing 
statute, the correction of error standard should be applied. 
Further, even if SEMECO and UARA's sister statute, UAPA, were to be disregarded 
as guidance (which the lower court did) the correction of error standard would still be 
applicable in any event. The correction of error standard applies to "interpretations of 
general questions of law." Administrative Services at 608. An example of a correction-of-
error type review is whether an agency has "acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction or 
authority." id. In the instant case, UAGC is challenging the Rule, for the most part, because 
BOGM acted beyond its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule. 
8
 The UAPA's sister provision, subsection (a)(i) of the UARA, provides "the 
rule violates constitutional or statutory law or the agency does not have legal authority to 
make the rule." 
28 
Thus, the correction-of-error standard is appropriate standard of review in this case, 
and should have been applied by the lower court. The lower court was presented the same 
argument and authority detailed above in relation to the motions for summary judgment 
below. Yet, despite being briefed on issues of the repeal of past standards and adoption of 
new standards for administrative rulemaking, the lower court rejected the correction-of-error 
standard and applied the "tolerable limits of reason" standard derived from the obsolete 
Williams language. 
The lower court's adoption of this obsolete standard of review is incorrect for at least 
two fundamental reasons. First, the lower court failed to address in any way the repeal of 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-14, and instead went on to apply a repealed standard of review as if 
it had never been repealed, and did so without invoking satisfactory authority for the 
adoption of that standard (invoking only the now-outmoded Williams case, which was 
decided before the repeal of § 54-7-14). Second, the lower court wrongly applied an 
(outmoded) intermediate "reasonable" standard of review (previously) applicable to the 
question of substantial evidence to the question of exceeding the scope of authority, which 
is governed by the stricter no-deference/correction-of-error standard. In other words, the 
court was faced with two issues arguably governed by two different standards of review, and 
chose to resolve both of them under one standard with no attempt to explain the grounds on 
which it did so. So on at least two fundamental levels, the lower court's adoption of the 
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"reasonable" intermediate standard of review was incorrect, and the resultant ruling premised 
on such an incorrect standard should be overturned. 
IV. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO GIVE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
DISCOVERY. 
As can be seen from the administrative record, a number of letters and other similar 
written materials had been submitted to BOGM during the course of the rulemaking process. 
Furthermore, at least DOGM, and possibly BOGM, had in their files certain correspondence 
and analyses relating to the Rule and to the Act which were never included as part of the 
administrative record as provided to the lower court. Given this disparity, it became 
imperative for AGCU to determine what materials BOGM actually had before it and relied 
on, as well as to what extent BOGM took into consideration materials in DOGM's files but 
not otherwise appearing in the administrative record in reaching its decision. Accordingly, 
ACGU made discovery requests in this vein. 
However, ACGU's discovery requests were resisted, and ultimately the lower court 
granted BOGM's Motion for a Protective Order. Record at 549-552. That protective order 
was improper under the circumstances because of the less thaa open and transparent nature 
of the rulemaking process as well as ACGU's lack of access to materials that may have 
actually been considered by BOGM but not otherwise included in the administrative record. 
Therefore, if for any reason this Court is inclined to affirm the lower court's holding, it 
should not do so until after AGCU has had an opportunity to conduct further discovery in 
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order to flesh out exactly what materials and information were actually considered by BOGM 
but not otherwise disclosed to the public during the rulemaking process. For that matter, 
AGCU should also be entitled to take the deposition of Representative Christensen, since he 
is the one person on whose statements BOGM basically rests its entire case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rule should be declared invalid because: (1) BOGM has exceeded its delegated 
scope of authority in attempting, through the rulemaking process, to bring subject matter 
under its administrative control that is expressly exempted from such control by legislative 
act, and thereby nullify the clear wording and legislative intent behind the affected statute; 
and (2) there was not substantial evidence presented to support the Rule's promulgation. 
Furthermore: (1) the lower court's ruling should be accorded no deference since it applied 
the incorrect standard of review in reviewing the Rule; and (2) the lower court erred in 
disallowing discovery into material that DOGM/BOGM had in its department files in this 
matter but did not include in the administrative record, and which may have had any bearing 
in the rulemaking process. For the foregoing reasons, both the Rule and the lower court's 
ruling should be overturned. 
DATED this N day of September, 2000. 
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quired in notice of intention — When con-
tents confidential — Approval of notice of 
intention not required for small mining op-
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40-8-1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Mined Land Reclamation Act." 1975 
40-8-2. Legislative findings. 
The Utah Legislature finds that 
(1) A mining industry is essential to the economic and 
physical well-being of the state of Utah and the nation. 
(2) It is necessary to alter the surface of the earth to 
extract minerals required by our society, but this should 
be done in such a way as to minimize undesirable effects 
on the surroundings. 
(3) Mined land should be reclaimed so as to prevent 
conditions detrimental to the general safety and welfare 
of the citizens of the state and to provide for the subse-
quent use of the lands affected. Reclamation require-
ments must be adapted to the diversity of topographic, 
chemical, climatic, biologic, geologic, economic, and social 
conditions in the areas where mining takes place. 1975 
40-8-3. Purpose. 
The purpose of this act is to provide that from the effective 
date of the act, except as otherwise provided in this act, all 
mining in the state shall include plans for reclamation of the 
land affected. 1975 
40-8-4. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) (a) "Approved notice of intention'' means a formally 
filed notice of intention to commence mining opera-
tions, including revisions to it, which has been ap-
proved under Section 40-8-13. 
(b) An approved notice of intention is not required 
for small mining operations. 
(2) "Board" means the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
(3) (a) "Deposit" or "mineral deposit" means an accu-
mulation of mineral matter in the form of consoli-
dated rock, unconsolidated material, solutions, or 
otherwise occurring on the surface, beneath the sur-
face, or in the waters of the land from which any 
product useful to man may be produced, extracted, or 
obtained or which is extracted by underground min-
ing methods for underground storage. 
(b) "Deposit" or "mineral deposit" excludes sand, 
gravel, rock aggregate, water, geothermal steam, and 
oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6, but 
includes oil shale and bituminous sands extracted by 
mining operations. 
(4) "Development" means the work performed in rela-
tion to a deposit following its discovery but prior to and in 
contemplation of production mining operations, aimed at, 
but not limited to, preparing the site for mining opera-
tions, defining further the ore deposit by drilling or other 
means, conducting pilot plant operations, constructing 
roads or ancillary facilities, and other related activities. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Oil, Gas and Min-
ing. 
(6) (a) "Exploration" means surface-disturbing activi-
ties conducted for the purpose of discovering a deposit 
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40-8-5. Authority to enforce chapter — Coordination 
of procedures — Department of Environmen-
tal Quality. 
(1) (a) The board and the division have jurisdiction and 
authority over all persons and property, both, public and 
private, necessary to enforce this chapter. 
(b) Any delegation of authority to any other state 
officer, board, division, commission, or agency to admin-
ister any or all other laws of this state relating'to mined 
land reclamation is withdrawn and the authority is un-
qualifiedly conferred upon the board and division as 
provided in this chapter. 
(c) Nothing in this chapter, however, shall affect in any 
way the right of the landowner or any public agency 
having proprietary authority under other provisions of 
law to administer lands within the state to include in'any 
lease, license, bill of sale, deed, right-of-way, permit, 
contract, or other instrument, conditions as appropriate, 
provided that the conditions are consistent with this 
chapter and the rules adopted under it. 
(2) (a) Where federal or local laws or regulations require 
operators to comply with mined land reclamation proce-
dures separate from those provided for in this chapter, the 
board and division shall make every effort to have its 
rules and procedures accepted by the other governing 
bodies as complying with their respective requirements. 
(b) The objective in coordination is to minimize the 
need for operators and prospective operators to undertake 
duplicating, overlapping, or conflicting compliance proce-
dures. . 
(3) Nothing in this chapter is intended to abrogate or 
interfere with any powers or duties of the Department of 
Environmental Quality. 1W6 
specific areas in which deposits or mineral deposits 
are most likely to exist. 
(b) "Exploration" includes, but is not limited to: 
sinking shafts; tunneling; drilling holes and digging 
pits or cuts; building of roads, and other access ways; 
and constructing and operating other facilities re-
lated to these activities. 
(7) "Land affected" means the surface and subsurface of 
an area within the state where mining operations are 
being or will be conducted, including, but not limited to: 
(a) on-site private ways, roads, and railroads; (b) land 
excavations; (c) exploration sites; (d) drill sites or work-
ings; (e) refuse banks or spoil piles; (f) evaporation or 
settling ponds; (g) stockpiles; (h) leaching dumps; (i) 
placer areas; (j) tailings ponds or dumps; and (k) work, 
parking, storage, or waste discharge areas, structures, 
and facilities. All lands shall be excluded that would 
otherwise be includable as land affected but which have 
been reclaimed in accordance with an approved plan or 
otherwise, as may be approved by the board, and lands in 
which mining operations have ceased prior to July 1, 
1977. 
(8) (a) "Mining operation" means those activities con-
ducted on the surface of the land for the exploration 
for, development of, or extraction of a mineral deposit, 
including, but not limited to, surface mining and the 
surface effects of underground and in situ mining, 
on-site transportation, concentrating, milling, evapo-
ration, and other primary processing. 
(b) "Mining operation" does not include: the extrac-
tion of sand, gravel, and rock aggregate; the extrac-
tion of oil and gas as defined in Title 40, Chapter 6; 
the extraction of geothermal steam; smelting or re-
fining operations; off-site operations and transporta-
tion; or reconnaissance activities and activities which 
will not cause significant surface resource distur-
bance or involve the use of mechanized earth-moving 
equipment such as bulldozers or backhoes. 
(9) "Notice of intention" means a notice to commence 
mining operations, including revisions to the notice. 
(10) "Off-site" means the land areas that are outside of 
or beyond the on-site land. 
(11) "On-site" means the surface lands on or under 
which surface or underground mining operations are 
conducted. A series of related properties under the control 
of a single operator but separated by small parcels of land 
controlled by others will be considered a single site unless 
excepted by the division. 
(12) "Operator" means any natural person, corpora-
tion, association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor, 
administrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organi-
zation or representative of any kind, either public or 
private, owning, controlling, or managing a mining opera-
tion or proposed mining operation. 
(13) "Owner" means any natural person, corporation, 
association, partnership, receiver, trustee, executor, ad-
ministrator, guardian, fiduciary, agent, or other organiza-
tion or representative of any kind, either public or private, 
owning, controlling, or managing a mineral deposit or the 
surface of lands employed in mining operations. 
(14) "Reclamation" means actions performed during or 
after mining operations to shape, stabilize, revegetate, or 
otherwise treat the land affected in order to achieve a 
safe, stable, ecological condition and use which will be 
consistent with local environmental conditions. 
40-8-6. Board — Powers, functions and duties. 
In addition to those provided in Title 40, Chapter 6,'the 
board has the following powers, functions, and duties: 
(1) lb enact rules according to the procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46a, that are reason-
ably necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
(2) lb hold hearings and to issue orders or other 
appropriate instruments based upon the results of those 
hearings. 
(3) To issue emergency orders according to the require-
ments and provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46b. 
(4) lb do all other things and take such other actions 
within the purposes of this act as may be necessary to 
enforce its provisions. 1W7 
40-8-7. Board and division — Authority — No retroac-
tive effect for rules, 
(1) The board and the division may require: 
(a) identification of the ownership of all interests in 
mineral deposits included within a notice of intention, 
including surface ownership of all land affected in the 
notice; 
(b) the making and filing, with the division, of true and 
correct copies of underground and surface mine maps; 
drill hole locations; area maps of existing and proposed 
operations; and information relating to volumes of mate-
rials moved or proposed to be moved or extracted, which 
are related to mined land reclamation; 
(c) the plugging or capping of drill holes and the closing 
of shafts and tunnels, made in mining operations after 
those facilities have served their intended purposes; 
(d) the reclamation of lands affected by mining opera-
tions after the effective date of this chapter having due 
surety to guarantee the performance of the duty to re-
claim the land affected in accordance with approved plans 
based upon on-site conditions; to treat each drill hole, 
shaft, or tunnel as may be required; and to pay legally 
determined public liability and property damage claims 
resulting from mining operations. The board shall pro-
mulgate rules concerning surety for mining operations; 
(f) that every operator who conducts mining operations 
in the state maintain suitable records and make periodic 
reports to the division in furtherance of the purposes of 
this chapter, 
(g) that with respect to all mining operations, a notice 
of intention is filed with and, if required by this chapter, 
approved by the division before any such mining opera-
tions are commenced or continued pursuant to Section 
40-8-23; 
(h) the suspension of mining operations in case of 
emergency conditions; 
(i) the payment of fixed, uniform, nonescalating permit 
fees; or 
(j) that mining operations be conducted so as to mini-
mize or prevent hazards to public health and safety. 
(2) No rule established by the board with respect to mined 
land reclamation shall have retroactive effect on existing 
reclamation plans included as a part of an approved notice of 
intention to commence mining operations which was approved 
prior to the effective date of the rule. 1987 
40-8-8. Board authority to act — Entry of order — 
Confidential data — Proceedings in case of 
violations. 
(1) The board may act by: 
(a) filing a notice of agency action; or 
(b) responding to a request for agency action initiated 
, - by any affected person. 
(2) (a) The board shall enter its order within 60 days after 
the hearing. 
(b) All orders entered by the board shall be: 
(i) entered in books to be kept by the board for that 
purpose; 
(ii) indexed; and 
(iii) public records open for inspection at all times 
during reasonable office hours. 
(c) Confidential data disclosed under this chapter shall 
be protected and not become public records, except as 
provided in Subsection 40-8-13(2). 
<3) (a) Whenever it appears that any person, owner, or 
operator is violating any provision of this chapter, or any 
rule or order made under the authority of this chapter, the 
board shall file a notice of agency action, and shall hold an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(b) All persons known to be affected by the violation, 
and the alleged violators, shall be given opportunity to be 
heard. 
(c) If, following this hearing, the board finds a viola-
tion, it maj". 
(i) issue an abatement or compliance order, or 
(ii) bring suit in the name of the state to restrain 
the violator from continuing the violation in any court 
in the state having jurisdiction in the county of 
residence of any defendant or in the county where the 
violation is alleged to have occurred. 
(d) In that suit, the court may grant injunctions, pro-
hibitory and mandatory, including temporary restraining 
orders and temporary injunctions. 
(e) Failure to comply with the terms of any injunction 
or order issued by the court is prima facie evidence of 
contempt and is punishable by the imposition of a penalty 
addition to any fine otherwise imposed for the violation of 
this chapter. 
(4) If a suit is filed against an operator, and a preliminary 
injunction or temporary restraining order is issued that would 
result in an operator being or ed to close his mining 
operation, the party instituting th *wsuit shall give security 
according to Rule 65A(c) of the Uta~ Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1987 
40-8-9. Evasion of chapter or rules — Penalties — 
Limitations of actions. 
(1) (a) Any person, owner, or operator who willfully or 
knowingly evades this chapter, or who for the purpose of 
evading tikis chapter or any rule or order issued under this 
chapter, willfully or knowingly makes or causes to be 
made any false entry in any report, record, account, or 
memorandum required by this chapter, or by the rule or 
order, or who willfully or knowingly omits or causes to be 
omitted from any report, record, account, or memoran-
dum, full, true, and correct entries as required by this 
chapter, or by the rule or order, or who willfully or 
knowingly removes from this state or destroys, mutilates, 
alters, or falsifies any record, account, or memorandum, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, is subject to 
a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation. 
(b) Each day of willful failure to comply with an emer-
gency order is a separate violation. 
(2) No suit, action, or other proceeding based upon a viola-
tion of this chapter, or any rule or order issued under this 
chapter, may be commenced or maintained unless the suit, 
action, or proceeding is commenced within two years from 
date of the alleged violation. 1987 
40-8-10. Notice. 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any notifica-
tion required by this chapter shall be given by the board or 
division by personal service to individuals directly affected 
and by one publication in a daily newspaper of general 
circulation in Salt Lake City, Utah, and in all newspapers of 
general circulation published in the county or counties in 
which the land affected is situated. 1987 
40-8-11. Budget of administrative expenses — Proce-
dure — Division authority to appoint or em-
ploy consultants. 
(1) The division, with the approval of the board, shall 
prepare a budget of the administrative expenses in carrying 
out the provisions of this act for the fiscal year next following 
the convening of the Legislature. This budget shall be submit-
ted to the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources for inclusion in the governor's appropriation re-
quest to the Legislature. 
(2) The division shall have authority to appoint or employ 
technical support or consultants in the pursuit of the objec-
tives of this act and shall be responsible for coordination with 
other agencies in matters relating to mined land reclamation 
and the application of related laws. 1983 
40-8-12. Objectives. 
The objectives of mined land reclamation are: 
(1) to return the land, concurrently with mining or 
within a reasonable amount of time thereafter, to a stable 
ecological condition compatible with past, present, and 
probable future local land uses; ; 
(2) to minimize or prevent present and future on-site or 
off-site environmental degradation caused by mining op-
erations to the ecologic and hydrologic regimes and to 
meet other pertinent state and federal regulations regard-
ing air and water quality standards and health and safety 
(3) to minimize or prevent future hazards to public 
safety and welfare. 1887 
40-8-12.5. Reclamation required. 
Every operator shall be obligated to conduct reclamation 
and shall be responsible for the costs and expenses thereof. 
1987 
40-8-13. Notice of intention required prior to mining 
operations — Assurance of. reclamation re-
quired in notice of intention — When contents 
confidential —Approval of notice of intention 
not required for small mining operations — 
Procedure for reviewing notice of intention. 
(1) (a) Before any operator begins mining operations, or 
continues mining operations pursuant to Section 40-8-23, 
he shall file a notice of intention for each individual 
mining operation with the division. 
(b) The notice of intention for small mining operations 
shall include a statement that the operator shall conduct 
reclamation as required by rules promulgated by the 
board. 
(c) The notice of intention for mining operations other 
than small mining operations shall include a plan for 
reclamation of the lands affected as required by rules 
promulgated by the board. 
(2) Information provided in the notice of intention and its 
attachments relating to the location, size, or nature of the 
deposit that is marked confidential by the operator shall be 
protected as confidential information by the board and the 
division and is not a matter of public record unless the board 
or division obtains a written release from the operator, or until 
the mining operation has been terminated as provided in 
Subsection 40-8-21(2). 
(3) (a) Within 30 days from the receipt of a notice of 
intention, the division shall complete its review of the 
notice and shall make further inquiries, inspections, or 
examinations that are necessary to properly evaluate the 
notice. 
(b) The division shall notify the operator of any objec-
tions to the notice and shall grant the operator a reason-
able opportunity to take action that may be required to 
remove the objections or obtain a ruling relative to the 
objections from the board. 
(4) Approval of a notice of intention for small mining 
operations is not required. 
(5) The notice of intention for mining operations other than 
small mining operations, shall be reviewed as provided in this 
subsection. 
(a) Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intention 
or within 30 days following the last action of the operator 
or the division on the notice of intention, the division shall 
make a tentative decision to approve or disapprove the 
notice of intention. 
(b) The division shall: 
(i) mail the information relating to the land af-
fected and the tentative decision to the operator, and 
(ii) publish the information and the decision, in 
abbreviated form, one time only, in all newspapers of 
general circulation published in the county where the 
land affected is situated, and in a daily newspaper of 
general circulation in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(c) The division shall also mail a copy of the abbrevi-
ated information and tentative decision to the zoning 
authority of the county in which the land affected is 
situated and to the owner of record of the land affected. 
(d) (i) Any person or agency aggrieved by the tentative 
decision may file a request for agency action with the 
(ii) If no requests for agency action are received by 
the division within 30 days after the last date of 
publication, the tentative decision on the notice of 
intention is final and the division shall notify the 
operator. 
(iii) If written objections of substance are received, 
the division shall hold a formal adjudicative proceed-
ing, 
(e) Subsection (5) does not apply to exploration. 
(6) Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intention 
concerning exploration operations other than small mining 
operations, the division will review the notice of intention and 
approve or disapprove it. n»7 
40-8-14. Surety requirement — Liability of small min-
ing operations for failure to reclaim — Forfei-
ture of surety. 
(1) After receiving notification that a notice of intention for 
mining operations other than small mining operations has 
been approved, but prior to commencement of those opera-
tions, the operator shall provide surety to the division, in a 
form and amount determined by the division or board as 
provided in this section. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)r the division 
shall approve the amount and form of surety. 
(b) In determining the amount of surety to be provided, 
the division shall consider: 
(i) the magnitude, type, and costs of approved 
reclamation activities planned for the land affected; 
and 
(ii) the nature, extent, and duration of operations 
under the approved notice. 
(c) The division shall approve a fixed amount estimated 
to be required to complete reclamation at any point in 
time covered by the notice of intent to an acceptable 
standard. 
(d) In determining the form of surety to be provided by 
the operator, the division shall approve a method accept-
able to the operator consistent with the requirements of 
this chapter. The form of surety that the operator may 
provide includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
(i) collateral; 
(ii) a bond or other form of insured guarantee; 
(iii) deposited securities; or 
(iv) cash. 
(3) (a) If the operator proposes reclamation surety in the 
form of a written contractual agreement, the board shall 
approve the form of surety. 
(b) In making this decision the board shall consider 
(i) the operator's: 
(A) financial status; 
(B) assets within the state; 
(C) past performance in complying with con-
tractual agreements; and 
(D) facilities available to carry out the 
planned work; 
(ii) the magnitude, type, and costs of approved 
reclamation activities planned for the land affected; 
and 
(iii) the nature, extent, and duration of operations 
under the approved notice. 
(4) In determining the amount and form of surety to be 
provided under this section, consideration shall be given to 
similar requirements made on the operator by landowners, 
governmental agencies, or others, with the intent that surety 
requirements shall be coordinated and not duplicated. 
• (5) The liability under surety provisions shall continue 
until liability in part or in its entirety, is released by the 
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<6) If the operator of a small mining operation fails or 
erases to carry'out the necessary land reclamation as re- -
[uired by this chapter and the rules of the board, the board, 
ifter notice and hearing, may order that: 
(a) reclamation be conducted by the division; and 
(b) the costs and expenses of reclamation, together 
with costs of collection including attorney's fees, be recov-
ered in a civil action brought by the attorney general 
against the Operator in any appropriate rourt. 
(7) (a) If the operator of a mining operation other than a 
small mining operation fails or refuses to carry out the 
necessary land reclamation as outlined in the approved 
notice of intention, the board may, after notice and hear-
ing, declare any surety filed for this purpose forfeited. 
(b) With respect to the surety filed with the division, 
the board shall request the attorney general to take the 
necessary legal action to enforce and collect the amount of 
liability. 
(c) If surety or a bond has been filed with the Division 
of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, the School and Insti-
tutional Trust Lands Administration, or any agency of the 
federal government, the board shall certify a copy of the 
transcript of the hearing and transmit it to the agency 
together with a request that the necessary forfeiture 
action be taken. 
(d) The forfeited surety shall be used only.for the 
reclamation of the land to which it relates, and any 
residual amount returned to the rightful claimant. 1998 
40-8-15. Notice of commencement to division — Opera-
tions and progress report. 
(1) Within 30 days after commencement of mining opera-
tions under an approved notice of intention, the operator shall 
give notice of such commencement to the division. 
(2) At the end of each calendar year, unless waived by the 
division, each operator conducting mining operations under 
an approved notice of intention shall file an operations and 
progress report with the division on a form prescribed in the 
rules promulgated by the board. 1987 
40-8-16. Approved notice of intention valid for life of 
operation — Withdrawal, withholding, or re-
fusal of approval — Procedure and basis. 
(1) An approved notice of intention or approved revision of 
it remains valid for the life of the mining operation, as stated 
in it/unless the board withdraws the approval as provided in 
Subsection (2). 
-* (2) The board or the division ^ hall not withdraw approval of 
a notice of intention or revision of it, except as follows: 
(a) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that the 
operator substantially fails to perform reclamation or 
conduct mining operations so that the approved reclama-
tion plan can be accomplished. 
« (b) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that the 
operator fails to provide and maintain surety as may be 
required under this chapter. 
(c) Approval may be withdrawn in the event that 
mining operations are continuously shut down for a 
period in excess of five years, unless the extended period 
is accepted upon application of the operator. 
(3) Approval of a notice of intention may not be refused, 
withheld, nor withdrawn by the division until the operator, 
who holds or has applied for such approval, has had an 
opportunity to request a hearing before the board, present 
evidence, cross-examine, and participate fully in the proceed-
ings. Based on the record of the hearing, the board will issue 
an order concerning the refusal, withholding, or withdrawal of 
the notice of intention. Ifno hearing is requested, the division 
mav rofiiop withhold or withdraw aonroval of a notice of 
(4) In the event that the division or the board withdraws 
approval of a notice of intention or its revision, all mining 
operations included under the notice shall be suspended in 
accordance with procedures and schedule approved by the 
division. • 1969 
40-8-17. Responsibility of operator to comply with ap-
plicable rules, regulations and ordinances — 
Inspections. 
(1) The approval of a notice of intention shall not relieve the 
operator from responsibility to comply with all other appli-
cable statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances, including 
but not limited to, those applying to safety, air and water 
pollution, and public liability and property damage. 
(2) As a condition of consideration and approval of a notice 
of intention, each applicant or operator under a notice of 
intention shall permit members of the board, the division, or 
other state agency having lawful interest in the administra-
tion of this act, to have the right, at all reasonable times, to 
enter the affected land and all related properties included in 
the notice of intention, whether or not approved, to make 
inspections for the purposes of this act. 1975 
40-8-18. Notice of intention to revise operations — 
Procedure. 
(1) In recognition that mining operations and related rec-
lamation plans may require revision to fit changing conditions 
or developing technology, an operator who is conducting min-
ing operations under an approved notice of intention shall 
submit to the division a notice of intention when revising 
mining operations. This notice of intention to revise mining 
operations shall be submitted in the form provided for in the 
rules promulgated by the board. 
(2) The notice of intention to revise mining operations will 
be designated as an amendment to the existing notice of 
intention by the division, based on rules promulgated by the 
board. An amendment of a notice of intention will be reviewed 
and considered for approval or disapproval by the division 
within 30 days of receipt of a notice of intention to revise 
mining operations. 
(3) A notice of intention to revise mining operations, if not 
designated as an amendment of a notice of intention, as set 
forth in Subsection (2), shall be processed and considered for 
approval by the division in the same manner and within the 
same time period as an original notice of intention. The 
operator shall be authorized and bound by the requirements of 
his existing notice until the revision is acted upon and any 
revised surety requirements are established and satisfied. 
(4) Small mining operations shall submit an amendment to 
the notice of intention when changes in the operations occur. 
Approval of an amendment of small mining operations is not 
required. 1987 
40-8-19. Transfer of mining operation under approved 
notice of intention. 
. Whenever an operator succeeds to the interest of another 
operator who holds an approved notice of intention or revision 
covering a mining operation, by sale, assignment, lease, or 
other means, the division may release the first operator from 
his responsibilities under his approved notice of intention, 
including surety, provided the successor assumes all of the 
duties of the former operator, to the satisfaction of the divi-
sion, under this approved notice of intention, including its 
then approved reclamation plan and the posting of surety. 
Upon the satisfactory assumption of such responsibilities by 
the successor operator, under conditions approved by the 
division, the approved notice of intention shall be transferred 
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40-8-20. Applicability. 
This actshall apply to all lands in the state of Utah, lawfully 
subject to its police power. No political subdivision of this state 
shall enact laws, regulations, or ordinances which are incon-
sistent with this act.
 t ; 1975 
40-8-21. . Temporary suspension or termination of op-
erations — Notice to division — Evaluation 
and inspection — Release of surety — Evi-
dence of compliance. 
(1) In the case of a temporary suspension of mining opera-
tions, excluding labor disputes, expected to be in excess of five 
years' duration, the operator shall", within 30 days, notify the 
division. 
(2) In the case of a termination of mining operations or a 
suspension of such operations expected to extend for a period 
in excess of two years, the operator shall furnish the division 
with such data as it may require in,order to evaluate the 
status of the mining operation, performance under the recla-
mation plan, and the probable future status of the. mineral 
deposit and condition of the land affected. ' 
(3) Upon receipt: of notification of termination or extended 
suspension, the division shall, within 30 days, cause an 
inspection to be made of the property and take whatever 
action may be appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of 
this chapter. 
(4) The full release by the division of surety posted under 
an approved notice of intention shall be prima facie evidence 
that the operator has fully complied with the provisions of this 
chapter. law 
40-8-22. Division cooperation — Agreements. 
(1) The division shall cooperate with other state agencies, 
local governmental bodies, agencies of the federal govern-
ment, and. appropriate private interest in the. furtherance of 
the purposes of tins act. 
(2) The division is authorized to enter into cooperative 
agreements with these agencies, as may be approved by the 
board, in furtherance of the purposes of this, act and may 
accept or commit funds in connection thereto as may be 
appropriated or otherwise provided for the purpose and as 
specifically approved by the board, except that such actions 
shall not result in any delegation of powers, responsibility, or 
authority conferred upon the board or division by this act., 
1975 
40-8-23. Effective dates — Exceptions. 
This act shall become effective sixty days after adjournment 
• of the Legislature except as follows: 
(1) Mining operations which are active on the effective 
date of this act will be required to prepare and submit a 
notice of intention on or before July 1, 1977, and shall he 
authorized to continue such existing operations until the 
operator obtains approval of his notice of intention. Such 
approval shall be obtained by the operator within 36 
months from the date of submission of this notice. Subse-
quent to approval of the notice of intention," the operator 
shall be bound by the provisions of the approved notice of 
intention and surety requirements as provided in Sections 
40-8-13 and 40-8-14. 
(2) Mining operations which are active on the effective 
date of this act and which are suspended or terminated on 
or before July 1,1977, shall advise the division ofthis fact 
before July 10/1977, and shall not be required to submit 
a notice of intention. 
(3) Mining operations which are inactive on the effec-
tive date of this act and which resume operations on or 
before July 1, 1977, shall be required to prepare and 
submit a notice of intention within twelve months follow-
the resumption of such operations, whichever i s earlier, 
and shall be authorized to conduct operations as described 
in the .notice of intention until the operator obtains 
approval of his notice of intention^ Such approval shall be 
obtained by the operator within 36 months from the date 
of submission of the notice. Subsequent to approval of the 
notice of intention the operator .shall be bound by the 
provisio as of the approved notice of intention and. surety 
requirements as provided in Sections ,40-8-13 and 40-8-14. 
(4) The board and division, in. the initial application of 
this act and until July 1,1977* shall npt be bound by the 
thirty-day time limitation within which to take action on 
a notice of, intention; but all notices of intention filed 
before July 1, 1977,. shall be acknowledged as received 
within thirty .days of receipt and.action shall be com-
menced by the division withintwelye.iionths jrom the 
date of receipt-
(5) This act and the rules and regulations promulgated 
pnderit shajl be fully effective for all operators and 
mining operations active on the effective date ofthis act or 
commenced or reactivated on and after Julv 1.1977. 
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Before the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining 
Department of Natural Resources 
State of Utah 
MAY 0 8 1998 
SECRETARY, BOARD OF 
OIL, GAS & MINING 
In the Matter of the Proposed Rule 
Amendment to Utah Administrative Rule 
R647-1-106, Minerals Regulatory 
Program Definitions for Sand, Gravel & 
Rock Aggregate 
CORRECTED FINAL 
ORDER TO ADOPT 
RULE1 
Docket No. 98-001 
Cause No. DAR 20727 | 
Pursuant to Notice, on April 22, 1998, at the Department of Natural Resources 
Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board") 
convened to deliberate in the above rulemaking matter, which arises under the Utah Mined 
Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. (1953, as amended) and the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-l et seq. (1953, as amended). 
Following the public comment hearing on February 25, 1998 and the close of the written 
comment period on March 18, 1998, the Board met solely to deliberate in executive session 
on April 22,1998. Since the public comment period for the above matter closed March 18, 
1998, no further evidence or oral argument was" heard at the April 22, 1998 deliberation 
hearing. 
To correct an inadvertent typographical error in the definition of "rock aggregate" as reprinted in that certain 
"Order to Adopt Rule" issued in this matter May 5,1998 and served May 7, 1998 (the "Initial Order"), the Board 
hereby issues this "Corrected Final Order to Adopt Rule" (the "Corrected Final Order"). Therefore, this Corrected Final 
Order supersedes and replaces the Initial Order. 
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The following Board members were present and participated at the 
deliberations, creating a quorum: Acting Chairman Elise L. Erler and Board members 
Stephanie Cartwright, W. Allan Mashburn, and Raymond Murray. Board member Thomas 
B. Faddies recused himself and took no part in the deliberations. Board Chairman Dave D. 
Lauriski and Board member Jay L. Christensen were excused from the meeting due to other 
conflicting appointments. 
Counsel to the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining ("DOGM") in this 
rulemaking matter was Assistant Attorney General Daniel G. Moquin. Counsel to the 
Associated General Contractors was Joseph C. Rust. Counsel to the Board was Assistant 
Attorney General Patrick J. O'Hara. 
Having deliberated, the Board's Order is as follows: 
The Board has received and carefully reviewed comments from the public 
about the proposed rule (i.e., an amendment to Utah Administrative Code R647-1-106) to 
define the meaning of "sand," "gravel" and "rock aggregate" for purposes of the Utah 
Minerals Program. The Board has considered all supporting and opposing comments, sworn 
testimony, and exhibits received into the administrative record in this rulemaking matter, and 
this decision is based on that record. 
The Board also has carefully considered all written comments filed with the 
Board's Secretary up until the close of the comment period on March 18, 1998. In particular, 
we have reviewed and considered five sets of comments from representatives of the 
following: 
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(1) Salt Lake City Corporation (dated 3/15/1998; filed 3/17/1998) (supporting 
the proposed rule); 
(2) Jack B. Parsons Companies (dated 3/17/1998; filed 3/18/1998) (opposing 
the proposed rule); 
(3) Kenton P. Barker and Georgia L. Barker (dated 3/2/1998; filed 3/3/1998) 
(supporting the proposed rule); 
(4) Associated General Contractors (dated 3/10/1998; filed 3/12/1998) 
(opposing the proposed rule); and 
(5) Cindy Cromer (dated 3/18/1998; filed 3/18/1998) (supporting the proposed 
rule). 
The Board is very grateful for all of the thoughtful and professionally prepared 
comments received from the public, as that input and citizen participation assisted the Board 
in deciding this important technical rulemaking matter. 
The Board has also reviewed the April 6, 1998 letter memorandum to the 
Board from DOGM Acting Director Braxton regarding "Analysis of Comments on the 
Proposed Sand Gravel and Rock Aggregate Proposed Rules-Cause No. DAR 20727", which 
memorandum was prepared by DOGM at the Board's request (the "Analysis Document"). 
By unanimous decision, the Board hereby instructs DOGM to publish as a final 
rule the above-referenced rule in the identical form as (a) previously published in the Utah 
State Bulletin and (b) as previously reviewed by the Board at its public hearing on February 
25, 1998. The Board's definitions are as follows: 
"Sand" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to 
moderately consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the 
dominant size range being between 1/16 mm to 2 mm, which has been 
deposited by sedimentary processes. 
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"Gravel" means a naturally occurring unconsolidated to 
moderately consolidated accumulation of rock and mineral particles, the 
dominant size range being between 2 mm and 10 mm, which has been 
deposited by sedimentary processes. 
"Rock Aggregate" means those consolidated rock materials 
associated with a sand deposit, a gravel deposit, or a sand and gravel deposit, 
that were created by alluvial sedimentary processes. The definition of rock 
aggregate specifically excludes any solid rock in the form of bedrock which 
is exposed at the surface of the earth or overlain by unconsolidated material. 
For the detailed reasons set forth in the Analysis Document, which the Board 
hereby adopts and incorporates by reference as its own, and for the additional reasons stated 
in this Order, the Board finds that the foregoing definitions are (a) amply supported by 
substantial evidence in the record and (b) are entirely consistent with the intended legal 
scope of the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-8-1 et seq. (1953, as 
amended) (the "Act"). For the cogent reasons set forth in the Analysis Document, the Board 
does not agree with the two commenters (i.e.. Jack B. Parsons Companies and the Associated 
General Contractors) who urge the Board to reject the "rock aggregate" portion of the 
proposed rule. 
The Board finds that the definitions of "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" set 
forth above are rationally based on substantial geological evidence and, as such, are entirely 
consistent with the letter and intent of the Legislative exemption in the Act for "sand, gravel 
and rock aggregate" operations. Since the Legislature chose to not define the meaning of 
"sand, gravel and rock aggregate" in the Act, the Board concludes that the Legislature 
expected and intended for the Board to use the Board's and DOGM's special technical and 
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administrative expertise over mining and geological matters to adopt, by rule, rational 
scientific definitions to implement the "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" exemption. Thus, 
to implement the "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" exemption in a rational and reasonable 
manner, and with no institutional intent to frustrate that exemption, the Board moves 
forward. 
The Board does not agree with the opponents' apparent contention that the 
definitions set forth above somehow improperly expand the Board's and DOGM's 
jurisdiction over previously exempt operators. The Board finds that the purpose and effect 
of the proposed rule is entirely consistent with the Legislature's intent. Indeed, the Board 
views the new rule as fulfilling the Legislature's desire to exempt bona fide "sand, gravel and 
rock aggregate" operations, but not others. The Board has no hidden agenda to expand its or 
DOGM's regulatory jurisdictional mandate over non-exempt mining operations in Utah. 
Instead, the Board has an affirmative and solemn obligation under the law to apply the Act 
to all persons covered by its requirements. The Board and DOGM apply the Act uniformly 
and fairly without discrimination, partiality, favoritism or bias for or against any non-exempt 
operator. Thus, all non-exempt mine operators within the scope of the Act must comply with 
its provisions. The Board has a non-negotiable duty under law fully and fairly to regulate all 
non-exempt operators. The Board finds that the new rule will help further this substantial 
governmental objective. The Board and DOGM simply do not have the option to exempt 
from regulation any non-exempt mine operators covered by the Act. 
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The Board's definitions of "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" rationally delimit 
the Board's and DOGM's jurisdiction so as to insure, as the Legislature intended, that bona 
fide "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" operators are not regulated by the Board or DOGM. 
To the extent an operation is a "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" operation (i.e., as those 
three key terms are defined in the new rule), that operation will remain, as it always has 
been, exempt from the Act While it is possible that certain mining operations which are not 
exempt, and really never have been exempt, may have been out of compliance with the Act, 
the scope of the Board's and DOGM's jurisdiction remains unchanged by the rule. Indeed, 
the Board hopes that the helpful definitional clarification provided by the rule substantially 
will improve the rate and level of voluntary compliance with the Act by all non-exempt 
operators in this State. 
DOGM shall coordinate with the Division of Administrative Rules to publish 
the final "sand, gravel and rock aggregate" definitional rule in exactly the same form as said 
rule was previously published in the Utah State Bulletin. 
The Secretary shall serve a copy of this Order on all persons who submitted 
public comments. Also, if a copy of the Analysis Document has not already been served by 
DOGM on said persons, a courtesy copy of the Analysis Document, too, shall be served with 
this Order. 
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A signed, faxed copy of this Order shall be decuicd equivalent to an cdginal 
for all purposes. 
ISSUED lhi« y « t o v ofMay, 1998. 
UTAHBOARD OF OIL>GAS AM1N1NCJ 
By_ 
HliscL.Erlcr 
Tts Acting Chairman 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
CORRECTED FINAL ORDER TO ADOPT RULE in the above-referenced rulemaking 
matter this Jj_ day of May, 1998 to the following: 
see Public Comment Service List (includes interested parties) attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. 
and that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of same on said date to: 
Daniel G. Moquin, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Division of Oil, Gas and Mining 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 140855 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0855 
Ms. Mary Ann Wright 
Associate Director of Mining 
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210 
P.O. Box 145801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801 
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
[ Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Mr. Lowell P. Braxton 
Acting Director 
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210 
P.O. Box 145801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801 
Mr. Ron Daniels 
Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 1210 
P.O. Box 145801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801 




John Adkins, Jr. 
P.O. Box 386 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Kenton P. Barker 
Georgia L. Barker 
2850 North 1000 West 
Ogden,Utah 84414 
Thomas E Bingham, President 
Utah Mining Association 
136 South Main, Suite 709 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Cindy Cromer 
816 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Jack B. Parson Companies 
Attn: Paul Glauser 
2350 South 1900 West 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
SERVICE LIST 
Joseph C. Rust, Esq 
Attorney for the 
Associated General Contractors 
KESLER & RUST 
36 South State Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rick Thorne, Executive Manager 
Utah Chapter 
Associated General Contractors 
1135 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
Attn: Craig A. Hinckley 
451 South State Street, Room 406 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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The parties1 Motions for Summary Judgment were argued February 
2, 2000, and the matter was taken under advisement. 
This action concerns a rule issued by the Board of Oil, Gas & 
Mining which defines the terms flsand,M "gravel,w and "rock 
aggregate," as utilized in the Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act, 
Plaintiff claims that the defendant exceeded its rulemaking powers 
by issuing a rule that is contrary to the purpose of the Utah Mined 
Land Reclamation Act. 
Plaintiff challenges the defendants rule under the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Section 63-46a-12.1(4) of that Act 
allows this Court to grant the plaintiff relief if it finds that: 
(a) the Board does not have the legal authority to make the rule; 
or (b) the rule is not supported by substantial evidence. 
ASSOC. GEN. V. BD. OF 
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Also at issue is the relevant standard of review. "Standard 
of review" governs the amount of deference this Court should give 
to the Board's rulemaking procedure. 
The Board moves for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and accordingly it is entitled 
to Judgment as a matter of law. The contractors move for Summary 
Judgment on similar grounds. 
The parties agree that there are no issues of material fact 
which would preclude the granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff argues that the Board did not have the legal 
authority to make the rule since the statute addresses the 
reclamation of mining lands and sand, gravel and rock aggregate 
extractions do not constitute mining operations. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, it seems plausible that the 
Board would promulgate a rule to define the terms "sand," 
"gravel"and "rock aggregate." Clarifying the terms simply insures 
that surety exemptions apply only to the proper entities. The 
plaintiff's second argument is that the rule is not supported by 
substantial evidence. They argue that the Board has not 
substantiated its claim that the rule was supported by substantial 
ASSOC. GEN. V. BD. OF 
OIL GAS & MINING PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
evidence. This argument is weak and the contractors fail to cite 
any specific facts to support their contention. 
Plaintiff argues that the proper standard of review should be 
correction of error/no deference, citing the case of SEMECO 
Industries v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167 
(Utah 1993). This case is distinguishable because Justice Durham 
in addressing the need for post-UAPA standards of review, speaks to 
cases in which the standard is at issue under UAPA and not UARA. 
While UAPA and UARA have similar provisions, there are significant 
differences between the two. Notably, judicial review under the 
UAPA speaks specifically to the appellate courts, while UARA refers 
to the district court. 
The Board moves for Summary Judgment on the basis that it had 
the authority to make the rule under Section 40-8-6(1) and 40-8-3. 
Both parties agree that the Mining Act is not applicable to sand, 
gravel and rock aggregate. The Board argues the rule provides 
definition to help clarify crucial undefined terms to insure that 
bona fide sand, gravel and rock aggregate operators are not 
regulated. The plaintiff obviously is concerned that sand, gravel 
and rock aggregate operators will be regulated who would not be in 
the absence of the rule. The Board argues that the rule is 
reasonable and based on substantial evidence. Substantial evidence 
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is defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 
First Nat1! Bank v. County Bd of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 
(Utah 1990). A review of the statutes and the cases persuade the 
Court that the Board1s definition does not improperly expand the 
Board's jurisdiction, that the Board1s definition corresponds with 
the overall purpose of the Mining Act, and that the Board's 
definition is consistent with Larson Limestone v. Division of Oil, 
Gas & Mining, 903 P.2d 429 (Utah 1995). The Court also adopts the 
standard of review for which the Board argues, that is, the 
tolerable limits of reason/intermediate deference as explained in 
Williams v. Public Serv. Coming of Utah. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1987). 
To reach that conclusion, the Board's definition of sand, gravel 
and rock aggregate has to be within the tolerable limits of reason. 
Williams sets the following parameters: (1) when reviewing general 
questions of law it is a correction of error standard; (2) when 
reviewing questions of fact, the court affords great deference; (3) 
when reviewing mixed matters of fact and law or when interpreting 
operative provisions of the statutory law, the rational standard in 
which the court should set aside only if*the rule is arbitrarily 
imposed beyond the limits of reason. This question falls into 
category (3). If (3) is the correct standard, the rule should only 
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be set aside if it is arbitrary and capricious. Plaintiff has 
failed to persuade the Court that there is anything arbitrary or 
capricious about the rule. Under the Mined Land Reclamation Act 
the Board is empowered to "enact rules according to the procedures 
and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46a, that are reasonably 
necessary to carry out the purpose of the Chapter 40-8-6(1) . •• The 
Board's rule defining sand, gravel and rock aggregate is within the 
purview of the Board fs power and appears to further the purpose of 
the Act. The Board agrees with the plaintiff that sand, gravel and 
rock aggregate are exempt. The rule rationally assists in 
determining those entities that are exempt from the Act. 
The administrative record consists of testimony from the 
briefing of Oil, Gas & Mining staff, as well as company materials. 
Viewed as a whole, the administrative record appears to support the 
rule by substantial evidence. Proper rulemaking procedures were 
followed. The rule corresponds with the purpose of the Mining Act, 
and the rule does not improperly expand the Board's jurisdiction. 
As indicated above, the Court finds the intermediate standard of 
review is appropriate, however, even if the appropriate standard of 
review had been the correction of err or/no "deference argued for by 
the plaintiff, the result would have been the same. The Board did 
not err in adopting the rule, and the Board's findings supporting 
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the rule are rationally based. Summary Judgment is awarded to the 
defendant. Defendant is to prepare a Judgment consistent with this 
opinion. 
Dated this .day of March, 2000. 
C2L 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this /( day of March, 2000: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Jason H. Robinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
36 S. State Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
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BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 980908915 
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for 
a Protective Order Concerning Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents. 
Also pending is plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum. 
In seeking a Protective Order, defendant argues that 
plaintiff's discovery requests are not even calculated to lead to 
discovery of admissible evidence, as required under Rule 26(b) (1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this lawsuit, plaintiff is 
challenging a rule promulgated by defendant, arguing that the rule 
is not in accord with the language of the Utah Mine Land 
Reclamation Act, Under the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
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Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46a-l (Supp. 1998) (U.A.R.A.), a person 
who is aggrieved by an administrative rule promulgated may file an 
action with the district court to seek judicial review of that 
rule. 
Defendant argues that a party challenging an administrative 
rulemaking may not supplement the administrative record in the 
district court, that the district court acts in an appellate 
capacity in reviewing administrative action and that its review to 
a challenged rule is limited to deciding (1) if the rule is 
consistent with applicable substantive law and/or (2) if it is 
supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. In 
arguing that the rulemaking record is already complete, with 
defendant acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, defendant asserts 
that this Court may not embark upon a de novo review. 
Plaintiff argues that the U.A.R.A. is devoid of language 
showing that the district court should act in an appellate capacity 
in reviewing administrative rulemaking decisions. Plaintiff argues 
that the district court should act as a ^trial court" and review 
the decision of the administrative agency in the capacity of a 
trial court. 
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This Court is persuaded by defendant's argument that the role 
of the district court is limited to determining whether the 
administrative agency has made a rational decision in compliance 
with the law and the substantial evidence on the record. 
Accordingly, this Court's review should be limited to the record of 
the administrative agency, which record has been filed with the 
Court by defendant. This ruling is based upon a review of the 
plain language of the U.A.R.A. and by defendant's arguments with 
regard to the law and policy. See, e.g., Rybachek v. Environmental 
Protection Agrencv, 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 fn. 25 (9th Cir. 1990). 
This Court further finds that defendant's Reply Memorandum is 
appropriate in scope. 
Therefore, defendant's Motion for a Protective Order is 
granted, and defendant's Motion to Strike Defendant's Memorandum is • 
denied. 
Defendant is to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this n day of March, 1999.^—;-.V: 
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MMLIUg CERTIFICATE. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, this 
day of March, 1999: 
Joseph C. Rust 
Jason C. Robinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
36 S. State Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Patrick J. O'Hata 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
